Couch, Mark Bradley (Author)
This dissertation is part of the growing criticism of Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor's standard arguments for multiple realization. In addition to the conceptual arguments they presented, there were empirical arguments offered for multiple realization in existing biological organisms in sciences like physiology. I argue that the empirical arguments offered are flawed. I approach the issue through a case study of vision in comparative physiology. The first part of the dissertation clarifies the standard account of functional explanation, and presents an improved account that is consistent with scientific practice. I argue that the standard account depends on a mistaken view about the relation between realizing mechanisms and functions. I show (1) that the account fails to attend to different levels of kinds in the context of functional explanation, and (2) that there are explanatory constraints that narrow down the range of mechanisms that realize a given function. Failure to attend to these points has led to widespread confusion about how functional explanation works. The second part of the dissertation then employs the improved framework in an examination of two common kinds of arguments. The first claims that the same kind of function is multiply realized in individuals of the same species, and is shown to depend mainly on a misunderstanding of kind individuation in scientific practice. The second claims that the same kind of function is multiply realized by members of different species due to the process of convergent evolution. Against this, I argue (1) that there is little chance that convergence can underwrite general physiological laws across widely separated species. (2) I also argue that while convergence sometimes produces similar functions in more closely related species (i.e., locally), these cases do not support the picture of physiology as a universal science. On either view, physiology is a local affair that is restricted in application in a way inconsistent with the standard account. I conclude that arguments for multiple realization are more limited than originally suggested, and that our understanding of sciences like physiology needs to be revised accordingly.
...MoreDescription “I approach the issue through a case study of vision in comparative physiology.” (from the abstract) Cited in Diss. Abstr. Int. A 67/05 (2006): 1756. UMI pub. no. 3215538.
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