Article ID: CBB001211948

“Thereby We Have Broken with the Old Logical Dualism”---Reinach on Negative Judgement and Negation (2013)

unapi

Does (affirmative) judgement have a logical dual, negative judgement? Whether there is such a logical dualism was hotly debated at the beginning of the twentieth century. Frege argued in `Negation' (1918/9) that logic can dispense with negative judgement. Frege's arguments shaped the views of later generations of analytic philosophers, but they will not have convinced such opponents as Brentano or Windelband. These philosophers believed in negative judgement for psychological, not logical, reasons. Reinach's `On the Theory of Negative Judgement' (1911) spoke to the concerns of these philosophers. While Frege took the distinction between affirmative and negative judgement to be logically redundant, Reinach argued that it is the result of confusing judgement with a different mental act. In this article, I present Reinach's arguments against the `old logical dualism' in context, analyse them and discuss Reinach's innovative use of the notion of focus in the theory of judgement. Recently, there has been a revival of the view that sentential negation is grounded in a prior mental act of rejection. In the final section, I argue that Reinach's analysis of rejection poses a challenge for the revivalists.

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Authors & Contributors
Macbeth, Danielle
Aho, Tuomo
Bellucci, Francesco
Centrone, Stefania
Eder, Günther
Goldfarb, Warren
Journals
History and Philosophy of Logic
Logica Universalis
Synthese
History of Philosophy Quarterly
Journal of the History of Ideas
Revue d'Histoire des Sciences
Publishers
Harvard University Press
Cambridge University Press
Vittorio Klostermann
Concepts
Logic
Philosophy
Philosophy of mathematics
Mathematics
Psychology
Proof
People
Frege, Gottlob
Russell, Bertrand Arthur William
Husserl, Edmund
Peirce, Charles Sanders
Bolzano, Bernard
Gödel, Kurt
Time Periods
19th century
20th century, early
20th century
Places
Germany
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